Pandemic technologies are abandoning public health experts. That is why this needs to change.

Susan Landau, a professor of cybersecurity and computer science at Tufts University, is the author of The number of people a book on how and why contact tracking applications are created. She also published an essay in Science last week, arguing that new technologies to support public health need to be well tested for ways that could contribute to the injustices and inequalities that are already ingrained in society.

“The pandemic will not be the last that people will face,” Landau wrote, calling on societies to “use and build tools and support health policy” that will protect people’s rights, health and safety and allow greater justice. in healthcare.

This interview has been shortened and edited for clarity.

What did we learn after the introduction of covid applications, especially about how they could work differently or better?

The technologists who worked on the applications were very careful not to turn to epidemiologists. What they probably haven’t thought about enough is: These apps will change who will be notified of potential Covid exposure. They will change the delivery of [public health] services. This is the conversation that did not happen.

For example, if I received an exposure notice last year, I would call my doctor, who would say, “I want you to be tested for COVID.” Maybe I would isolate myself in my bedroom and my husband would bring me food. Maybe I wouldn’t go to the supermarket. But other than that, it won’t change much for me. I don’t drive a bus. I am not a food service worker. For these people, getting an exposure notification is really different. You need to have social services to support them, which is something that public health knows about.

In Switzerland, if you receive an exhibition notice and the state says “Yes, you have to quarantine”, they will ask: “What is your job? Can you work from home? “And if you refuse, the state will come in with some financial support to stay at home. This puts social infrastructure in support of the exposure notice. Most places didn’t – the United States, for example.

Epidemiologists are studying how the disease spreads. Public health [experts] see how we take care of people and they have a different role.

Are there other ways in which applications could be designed differently? What would make them more useful?

I think there is certainly an argument that 10% of applications collect location to be used for medical purposes only to understand the spread of the disease. When I spoke to epidemiologists in May and June 2020, they said, “But if I can’t say where it’s spreading, I’m losing what I need to know.” It’s a matter of management from Google and Apple.

There is also the question of how effective this is. This has to do with the issue of equity. I live in a small countryside and the house closest to me is a few hundred feet away. I will not receive a Bluetooth signal from someone else’s phone that results in an exposure notification. If my bedroom turns out to be directly opposite the bedroom of the next apartment, I could get a whole bunch of exposure notifications, if the next person is sick – the signal can go through wooden walls.

Why has privacy become so important to contact tracking application designers?

What you’ve been is really revealing because it shows things like who you slept with or whether you stopped at the bar after work. It shows if you go to church on Thursday at seven, but you never go to church another time, and it turns out that Alcoholics Anonymous met at church then. It is obvious to human rights workers and journalists that tracing who they have been with is very dangerous because it reveals their sources. But even for the rest of us with whom you spend time – the closeness of people – is something very personal.

“The end user is not an engineer … this is your uncle. This is your little sister. And you want to have people who understand how people use things. “

Other countries use a protocol that includes more location tracking – Singapore, for example.

Singapore said, “We will not use your data for other things.” Then they changed it and used it for law enforcement purposes. And the app, which began as a voluntary one, is now needed to enter office buildings, schools, etc. There is no choice but for the government to know who you are spending time with.

I’m curious about your thoughts on some bigger lessons for building social technologies in crisis.

I work in the field of cybersecurity and in this area it took us a long time to understand that there is a user at the other end and the user is not an engineer sitting in Sun Microsystems or Google in the security group. It’s your uncle. This is your little sister. And you want to have people who understand how people use things. But this is not something that engineers are trained for – it is something that public health people or social scientists do, and these people must be an integral part of the decision.